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4 Douglas Kellner 
The Bush ~dmin~strati?n' s Big Lies: A Case Study of 
Media Marupulation and Disinformationl 
By Douglas Kellner 
University of Texas at Austin 
. After ~~.e Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, interest in "the crisis 
in th~ Gulf. increased when the U.S. claimed that Iraq might also invade Saudi Arabia~ which was said to control 20 percent of the world's known oil reserves ~~~an investment p~rtfo~o eve~, larger than Kuwait's. 2 George Bush, who had 
in1hally attacked the invasion as naked aggression," heated up his rhetoric and 
declared on August 5 that the invasion "would not stand." Two days later he 
sent thousands of troops to Saudi Arabia. The Bush administration had thu; set ~he st~ge for t~e Gulf war by failing to warn Iraq of the consequences of invad1n~ Kuwait an~ then by quickly sending troops to Saudi Arabia while, as 
I .argue i~ The PersUln Gulf TV War (Kellner 1992, pp. 30ff), undercutting 
diplomatic efforts to resolve the crisis. 
!Jthough the United State~ constantly accused Iraq and Saddam Hussein 
of lying a_nd compared the Iraqi leader to Hitler, the Bush administration itself 
sy~tematically dis~e.mina.ted Big Lies to promote its war policy. Suspicious 
claims b~ the adm1mstration began with reports that the Iraqis had positioned 
an offensive force on the Saudi Arabian border, poised to invade that country ~ August 3, for instance, Forrest Sawyer reported on ABC's Nightline that: 
tens. of thousands of Iraqi troops are reportedly massed along the Saudi 
A:ab1a.n border, and there is still fear that Saddam Hussein will carry his 
blitzkrieg across Saudi territory. It would not be much of a fight. Iraq's million-
man battle:-seasoned army against the nearly 66,000 Saudi troops, 5,500 Iraqi 
tanks, 10 times as many as Saudi Arabia." 
h There i~ no compelling evidence that Iraq did have large numbers of troops on~ e Saudi border and the same day ABC news reported the Iraqi ambassador's ~tl~:1s t~~t Iraq ~ad. n~ intention whatsoever of invading Saudi Arabia and that 
. JUSt a big he that there were Iraqi troops preparing to invade Saudi 
1i;'a:ia · Moreover, as I shall show, there are indications that from the beginning 
t ~ en~agon~nd Bush administration consistently exaggerated the Iraqi threat 
to audi Arabia, ~r even manufactured it, to justify their intervention. There is ~so :easo~to believe that the Bush administration deliberately overestimated 
e s.ize an . ~ompetency of the Iraqi army in Kuwait and that the mainstream °;i~dia~':hcally reproduced the ~dministration's (dubious) figures repeat-
e Y· . ~ ugust 4, the New York Tzrnes headline read: "Ira is Mass on Saudi ~~~:~ a~d the story indicated that: "Pentagon officials s~d that more than 
' raqi troops were massing in the southern part of Kuwait, not far from 
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a major oilfield in Saudi Arabia. A State Department spokesman, Richard A. 
Boucher, said Iraqi troops were within five to ten miles of the frontier. The 
British foreign secretary, Douglas Hurd, said that Iraqi troops were massing on 
the border ... . There were conflicting reports about the size of the Iraqi military 
force in Kuwait, but one Pentagon official estimated late today that it was 
approaching 100,000 troops, or more than Iraq needs to pacify and occupy 
Kuwait" (p. A4). 
The television networks dutifully repeated these figures day after day 
without a modicum of skepticism. There is no reason, however, why one 
should have accepted these figures or the claim that the Iraqis were gathering 
ontheSaudiArabiaborderasiftoinvade.Onthecontrary,compellingevidence 
suggested that U.S. claimsconcerningtheimminentlraqi threattoSaudi Arabia 
were pure disinformation designed to legitimate a U.S. military intervention in 
the Gulf. In particular, the claim that Iraqis were ready to invade Saudi Arabia 
served to scare the Saudis into allowing a major U.S. troop deployment on their 
soil and to convince the U.S. and world public that serious interests (i.e., the flow 
of oil) were being threatened. The Iraqis claimed repeatedly that they had no 
designs on Saudi Arabia, no intention of invading, and because there were no 
independent sources of information in Kuwait, it was impossible to verify if the 
United States was or was not telling the truth concerning the Iraqi troop 
formations on the Saudi border that were allegedly poised for invasion. 
On August 5, the Pentagon continued to claim that Iraq was threatening 
Saudi Arabia. The New York Times stated: ''Iraqi troops were reported to have 
gone into what is called the Neutral Zone, an area from which Kuwait and Saudi 
Arabia share oil earnings. Baghdad denied those reports as 'false news"' (p. Al). 
In addition, the Times disclosed: 
A Pentagon official said that any quick Iraqi attack on Saudi Arabia 
would have to be without the logistical support usual for a major 
operation. 
"They have not brought a lot down to Kuwait for a large scale drive 
into Saudi Arabia," said an official. 
"A long-term drive would require more of a logistical tail - more 
water, gas, fuel, ammunition, spare parts and all of that," the official 
said. (p. AlO) 
Despite this disclaimer, buried in a story on page 10, the Bush administra-
tion and mainstream media were sending out signals that an Iraqi invasion of 
Saudi Arabia was an imminent and dangerous threat.3 On August 6, the 
message of the Bush administration was that the Arab countries were "not 
serious enough" concerning the Iraqi threat and were prepared to capitulate to 
Iraqi demands and accept its takeover of Kuwait. The New York Times com-
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mented: 
Administration officials are increasingly concerned about the unwill-
ingnes~ of Saudi Arabia and the other leading Arab countries to stand 
up against Mr. Hussein. Officials say they detect a strong tendency in 
~he Arab world to try to appease Baghdad bylettingitswallowKuwait 
in .hopes that this will spare Iraq's neighbors from a similar fate. 
Pi:ivately, American officials are expressing contempt and disgust 
with most of the Arab leaders. 
"The habits of centuries die hard," said a senior Administration 
official about the seeming instinct of Iraq's oil-rich neighbors to try to 
buy Baghdad off rather then forcefully confront it." (August 6 1991 p. A6) I I 
!'!ote how the sources for every sentence of this story are "Administration 
official~" who are obviously using the media to put out a propaganda line. 
!oumahs.ts are dep~ndent on official sources to get leads, leaks, and background 
~formation that will help them i~ the highly competitive business of journal-
ism. The sy~tem of news production and competition thus forces journalists to 
r.ely on offiaa 1 s?urces who reward journalists who convey the information and 
~ne tha~ they wish pro~oted with further inside information, while punishing 
!ournalists who question their positions. Thus, in a crisis situation, without 
independent sources of information, mainstream journalists tend to rely on 
official sources who are able to manipulate them. 
Precisely such a process of manipulation was evident in the crisis in the 
G~ as the Bush ad.minis~ation used the mainstream media to conjure up an 
Iraqi t~eat to Saudi Arabia ~d to legitimate the deployment of U.S. troops in 
the region. The New York Tzmes headline on August 6 read: "Bush, Hinting 
Force, ~~dares Gulf Impasse 'Will Not Stand"' and the sub-headline pointed 
to a m1ss1on by Se~etary of Defense Dick Cheney to Saudi Arabia to try to 
persuade the Saudis to let the United States use military installations in their 
country. Tuer~ .is evidence that, early on, the Bush administration decided on 
the use of military force to resolve the crisis and chose the road to war. Henc~forth, there would be no serious talk within the administration of a 
negotiated settlement; instead, the administration planned step by step its 
relentless march to war.4 
Th~ media helped the Bush administration by beating the war drums and 
producing an atmosphere where it was all too likely that military force would ~e use~ t? resolve the crisis i~ ~he G_ulf. ~ particular, the Washington Post not ~~pnvil~ged the Bush admtrustration lineduringthecrucial early days of the 
cns1s, bu~ itself promoted a military option. On August 3 Patrick T 1 h had previo l . t . , y er, w o 
us Y wn ten an article on Saddam Hussein as a "pragmatic" Arab 
leader (May 13, 1989, p. A13) suddenly discovered that Hussein was a ''brash 
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and brutal leader, whose tactics have terrorized his neighbors, incited the 
Israelis with threats of chemical retaliation and made the superpowers look like 
helpless giants" (p. A25). Also on August 3, George Will attacked the "Wolf of 
Babylon" while two Post Op-Ed (opinion-editorial) page writers discovered 
Iraq's ''Nuclear Specter"; neoconservative Charles Krauthammer deplored the 
"festival of appeasement" and a Post editorial attacked the "Aggression in the 
Gulf" and the "dictator Saddam Hussein." A business article noted that 
Hussein is now "OPEC's Most Important Member," claiming that he now 
controlled world oil prices.5 
The August 7 edition of the Washington Post aggressively promoted a 
military solution, while demonizing the Iraqi leader. Before Bush even an-
nounced his decision to send U.S. troops to Saudi Arabia, the Post was calling 
for a U.S. military response to Iraq's invasion. On p. A2, Mary McGrory, in a 
column titled "Bush and the Beast of Baghdad," urged Bush to bomb Iraq. She 
assured Bush that" Americans, faced with the specter of high oil prices and new 
hostage-grabs, are emotionally involved in getting rid of the beast" and that the 
''best thing Bush has going for him is the just about unanimous approval to do 
whatever is necessary." Note that McGrory referred to Saddam Hussein as a 
''beast"-perhaps the ultimate dehumanizing epithet. Not only did she demon-
ize the Iraqi leader, but she suggested-falsely-that Bush had a mandate from 
the public to bomb Baghdad and to do "whatever is necessary," thus urging and 
legitimating ruthless military action. After producing a litany of Hussein's 
bestial acts, McGrory evoked the Munich analogy, recalling the appeasement 
of Hitler in the 1930s at the Munich conference, implicitly warning against 
similar treatment of the Iraqis.6 
·Note, however, the reasons, such as they are, that McGrory recommended 
bombing "the beast" and how she identifies Iraq with its president as if 
bombing Iraq were equivalent to bombing Hussein. She claimed that "Saudi 
Arabia is in imminent danger of being invaded by Saddam" and then asked 
rhetorically if bombing Baghdad will "move up his timetable on the invasion 
of Saudi Arabia?" McGrory assumed that Saddam Hussein will invade Saudi 
Arabia and that therefore he should be bombed to punish him for his transgres-
sions. This absolutely irresponsible call for violent military action disregarded 
all of the good reasons why it was unlikely that Iraq would invade Saudi Arabia. 
Indeed, had that been the Iraqi plan, the only rational way to carry it through 
would have been to do so immediately, although there is not a shred of evidence 
that Iraq ever had this in mind. 
This was supplemented in the Washington Post's August 7 edition by both 
an opinion piece and a front-page article which suggest that the Post was being 
used in a disinformation campaign to legitimate a U.S. intervention in Saudi 
Arabia and was engaging in "yellow journalism" to promote a military solu-
tion? On that day, the Post's associate editor and chief foreign correspondent 
Jim Hoagland kicked in with a column: "Force Hussein to Withdraw'' (p. A19). 
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As certain as McGrory of Iraq's imminent invasion of Saudi Arabia, Hoagland 
opened by proclaiming that "Saddam Hussein has gone to war to gain control 
of the oil fields of Kuwait and ultimately of Saudi Arabia. The United States 
must now use convincing military force against the Iraqi dictator to save the oil 
fields and to preserve American influence in the Middle East." According to 
Hoagland, Saddam Hussein "respects only force and will respond to nothing 
else." 
The rest of the article consisted of false analysis, questionable analogies, 
and bellicose banality. Hoagland claimed that the ''Iraqi dictator's base of 
suppo~t is too narrow and too shaky to withstand a sharp, telling blow." Yet 
some SlX weeks of the most vicious bombing in history were unable to dislodge 
Hussein whose support, or staying power, was obviously much stronger than 
Hoagland could imagine. Hoagland also believed that "he [Hussein] is so hated 
a~ home tha~ his defeat, even by foreign forces, will be greeted as deliverance by 
his own nation and by much of the Arab world." As it turned out, both Iraq and 
the Arab world were deeply divided over Hussein and the sweeping generali-
ties that Hoagland employed were totally off the mark. 
Hoagland bordered on overt racism when he claimed that the Arab nations 
were too weak to "deliver that blow themselves" (one wonders what blow the 
hot-penned warrior at the Post had in mind). He also claimed that Ronald 
Reagan's decision to bomb Libya was the right model for Bush to follow. This 
example was revealing because Moammar Gadhafi preceded Saddam Hussein 
as a.symbolicallyconstructed Arab enemy upon which national hatred could be 
pro1ected and thus served as an object lesson for Third World countries that 
re~se.d ~o submit to domination by the nee-imperialist superpowers. 8 Like-
wise, it is far from certain that the terrorist incident for which Gadhafi was 
"p~~ished". (i.e.: the bombing of a Berlin disco) was carried out by groups 
affiliated with Libya.9 But facts have little relevance to an ideologue's brief for 
bombing. 
In his opinion piece, Hoagland lectured George Bush on why he must take 
ur.g~nt and forceful action to save his presidency and, like McGrory, urged 
~ihtary acti.on ag~inst Iraq. Hoagland assumed both that Iraq planned to 
invade Saudi Arabia and that only a military blow from George Bush could save 
~h~ .day. In fact, as I shall soon discuss, there were important Arab diplomatic 
~tiatives underway, blocked by the United States, but these efforts were 
ignored by the war~mongering Hoagland. Letting his reactionary beliefs slip 
thr?~gh, Hoagland ~te.rpreted Iraq's invasion of Kuwait as a challenge to "the 
legitimacy of all rema1nmg monarchies in the Arabian Peninsula where Britain 
established most existing boundaries and political systems in th~ colonial era." 
Hoagland ~hus defined the principles at stake as the legitimacy of some of the 
m?~t reactio~a~ monarchies in the world, with borders arbitrarily drawn by 
Bntish c?loruahsts w~o .deprived Iraq of a viable seaport and robbed national 
groups like the Palestiruans and the Kurds of their homelands. 
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Indeed, Hoagland's whole article manifests what Edward Said (1978) 
described as an "Orientalist" mentality in which white Westerners establish 
their superiority by vacuous generalizations about people in the Arab world. 
Hoagland characterized Arabs as understanding only force, too weak to 
respond to aggression, and incapable of defending themselves and solving 
their own problems. For him, the Gulf crisis is thus the locus of "a rare case 
where the United States would be unwise not to use force." Analyzing such 
intellectually bankrupt pleas for a military strike against Iraq would not be 
worth the time and energy except that administration officials paid close 
attention to Hoagland' s columns. Further, his poorly written, badly argued, 
and banal punditry was highly acclaimed in political circles; indeed, he was 
awarded a Pulitzer prize "for searching and prescient columns on events 
leading up to the Gulf War." In addition, his and McGrory's columns are 
significant because they were published in the Washington Post, supposedly a 
bastion of liberal enlightenment, and read by U.S. policymakers and the 
mainstream media. Further, McGrory' s demonization of Hussein was retooled 
and republished in Newsweek (Sept. 3, 1990), a part of the Washington Post 
Company. 
In fact, the Washington Post in its August 7 edition almost seemed to be 
prodding Bush to send troops to Saudi Arabia and to use force to resolve the 
crisis. The Post's banner headline across the top of page 1 stated: "Saddam says 
Seizure of Kuwait Is Permanent" and a lead story by Patrick TylerlO claimed: 
Saddam called in the ranking U.S. diplomat in Baghdad, and told him 
categorically that Kuwait now belongs to Iraq and there was no going 
back, according to Administration officials. ''It's a done deal," one U.S. 
official said, characterizing Saddam's message. 
Another official said Saddam appended a specific warning that if 
Saudi Arabia shuts down the Iraqi crude oil pipelines that cross the 
Saudi desert to the Red Sea, Iraq will attack the kingdom. The warning 
further stated that if American forces intervene in the region, Iraq will 
"embarrass" the United States, the official said. 
In retrospect, this story is sheer disinformation and the Washington Post 
reported once again merely what Bush administration officials told them as if 
it were fact, making Hussein sound as belligerent and threatening as possible. 
And although Iraq did in fact keep hold of Kuwait, according to other sources 
(Salinger and Laurent 1991 and Emery 1991), it was seeking to cut a deal to 
resolve the crisis, but from the beginning the Bush administration simply 
refused to negotiate. Other accounts of the meeting of Saddam Hussein with the 
U.S. charge d' affaires in Baghdad, Joe Wilson, provide a quite different story. 
According to Karsh and Rautsi (1991): 
During the [August 6] meeting [with Joe Wilson], Hussein was far 
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more affable than in his bellicose encounter with Ms. Glaspie a 
fortnight earlier. "Iraq is firmly willing to respect the United States' 
legitimate international interests in the Middle East," he told Mr. 
Wilson, "and is interested in establishing normal relations with the 
United .sta.t~s on the basis of mutual respect." Dismissing the reports 
on Iraqi military deployments along the Saudi border as fabrications 
?im:d at providing "pretexts to interfere in the region's affairs and t~ 
JUStify an aggression against Iraq," he reassured his interlocutor that 
~q har~or:d no :vil. inte~tions whatsoever against Saudi Arabia, 
with which it was tied in a bilateral treaty of non-aggression. (P. 220) 11 
The ~uthors claim that sue~ conciliatory gestures under duress are typical 
of H ussem and that he was making every effort possible to assure the world that 
he had no intention of invading Saudi Arabia: 
EvenacursoryexaminationofSaddam'spoliticalrecordwouldreveal 
that h~s.instinctive inclination, whenever faced with overwhelming 
opposition, was to appease rather than to confront to try to defuse 
tensions, rather than to escalate. ' 
. ~s initial re~ponse to the bu~ldup of~ternational pressures following the 
1nvas10n of Kuwait was no exception. While threatening to turn the Gulf into "a 
graveya:d for those who think of committing aggression," he took great care to 
emp~asizethetemp~rarynatureofthelraqiintervention,reiteratinghispledge 
to .wi.thdraw the Iraqi forces "as soon as the situation settles down and the evil 
gnp is loosened on Arab Kuwait." 
Moreover, within l~ss than 36 hours of the invasion, the Iraqi public 
learned, thro~gh a special announcement of the RCC [Revolutionary Com-
ma~d Council], that their ~alf1ant armed forces had completed "thei! honest natio~al and pan-Arab duties of defending Kuwait, and were to begin with-
drawmg from the i:'rincipality on August 5, "unless something emerges that thr~t~n~ the sec~ty of Kuwait and lraq." ... A special emphasis in Saddam's 
conciliating camp~1gn w~s placed on denying any possibility of an impending 
Iraq.act of aggression against Saudi Arabia. "Some news agencies have reported 
fabn:ated news about what they called the approach oflraqi forces toward the 
Sau~i border," read an official Iraqi statement. ''Iraq categorically denies these fab:ica~ed reports. Causing confusion between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
wh1ch.1s a frat~rnal country with which we have normal cordial relations and 
Kuwait's case is tendentious." This message was quickly conveyed to the heads 
of A~b states, E~t and Saudi Arabia in particular, by high-ranking officials. 
More rmportantly, it.was direc~ly relayed to President Bush in an oral message 
from SaddamHussem, transmitted at a meeting with the V.S.charged'affaires in 
Baghdad, Joseph Wilson. (Karsh and Rautsi 1991, pp. 219-220). 
The transcript of the conversation on August 6 between Wilson and 
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Hussein (published in Salinger and Laurent1991, pp.137-147 and Sciolino 1991, 
pp. 284-293) supports the Iraqi version and suggests that the Washington Post 
version was fabricated by the Bush administration and dutifully transmitted by 
the Post. The key issues concern: (1) whether Iraq was really planning to invade 
Saudi Arabia, as it was the threat of such an invasion that Bush used to justify 
sending U.S. troops to the Gulf on August 7; and (2) whether Iraq was or was 
not prepared to negotiate a settlement to the crisis. The transcript of the Wilson 
meeting with Hussein suggests that rather than being aggressive and intransi-
gent, Hussein made it clear from the beginning that he was willing to negotiate 
a solution to the Gulf crisis and had no intention whatsoever of invading Saudi 
Arabia. The Post story, by contrast, indicated that Hussein was not prepared to 
negotiate a settlement. Furthermore, two Post columnists on August 7 insinu-
ated that an Iraqi invasion of Saudi Arabia was imminent and that only 
bombing Iraq could deter Iraqi aggression. In a summary article on the 
invasion, one of the Washington Post's top reporters, Patrick Tyler, wrote: "The 
initial move to seize Kuwait was relatively painless. But the next step that 
Saddam reportedly threatened yesterday-a possibleinvasionofSaudiArabia-
would pose immense difficulties for the Iraqi leader,forcing his army to operate 
far from home, at the end of long supply lines, in the intense summer heat of the 
desert" (p. A9). 
This passage repeats the claim that Saddam Hussein threatened to invade 
Saudi Arabia, despite the lack of any compelling evidence. Moreover, Tyler's 
own text indicated the extreme unlikelihood that Iraq would invade Saudi 
Arabia right after taking Kuwait because of the logistical difficulties that such 
an invasion would entail (to say nothing of the political response of the West 
that obviously would not tolerate such a move). Indeed, during this period, the 
American Friends Service Committee put out a report that concluded: 
Prior to the deployment of the multinational forces to Saudi Arabia 
many informed analysts believed that Iraq would not continue past 
Kuwait to the Saudi oil fields, for at least five reasons: (1) Whereas 
Kuwait had angered Iraq by exceeding its OPEC oil quota, Iraq and 
Saudi Arabia had been coordinating their oil pricing policies before 
the invasion, in opposition to Kuwait; (2) It will take some time for Iraq 
to absorb Kuwait and assess the situation; (3) Saudi Arabia's military 
forces, while still small com pared to Iraq's, are much larger and more 
capable than Kuwait's were; (4) Supply lines for Iraqi forces would 
become overstretched and vulnerable to Saudi air attack; and (5) An 
attack on Saudi Arabia would almost certainly prompt military inter-
vention by the United States and other countries. (August 8, 1990; in 
PeaceNet mideast.gulf archive)12 
Other informed observers also doubted that Iraq ever had any intention of 
invading Saudi Arabia. Bulloch and Morris (1991) argue that: "For all the talk 
of Saddam's plans to attack the kingdom, it never seemed likely. The Iraqi 
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deployment, once Kuwait was taken, was entirely defensive, and the much-
cited move towards the Saudi border was merely the pushing out of frontlines 
and trip~es ~hich any p~dent commander would undertake when setting 
up a defensive hne. All the evidence was that suggestions of possible moves into 
Saudi A~abia by the Iraqis were merely propaganda designed to support the 
huge build-up of forces by America and its allies" (pp. 169-170). Martin Yant 
concluded that, "many analysts now question whether Iraqi tanks were ever 
poised to roll into Saudi Arabia. Historians may someday compare this claim 
to the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin incident, in which a clash between U.S. destroyers 
and .Vietnamese to1:Pedo boats was apparently blown out of proportion by 
President Johnson in order to gcti.n congressional authority to expand the 
Vietnam War" (1991, p. 90). 
Thus the Bush administration and Washington Post disinformation con-
cem~ng ~he Iraqis' readine.ss to in va~e Saudi Arabia worked effective! y to shape 
me~ia discourse and pubhc perception of the crisis and to legitimate U.S. policy, 
as did Tyler's front-page story concerning Hussein's meeting with Joe Wilson 
and Iraq's a~eged refusal to negotiate a solution or leave Kuwait. The same day 
as the Wa~hzngton Post article, the Iraqi news service denied the report that Iraq 
was massing troops on the Saudi/Kuwaiti border and claimed that it had no intenti~n of inv~ding Saudi Arabia; this report was cited in the Japan Economic 
Newswzre, the Xznhua General Overseas News Service, and some Reuters reports on 
August 7, but was generally disregarded by the U.S. mainstream media. Also, 
on ~ugust 7, Stat: Department spokesperson Margaret Tutweiler described the 
Iraqi troops ma~sing on ~he bordc::1° a~d presented Joseph Wilson's meeting with 
Saddam Hussein negatively, bwlding on the Washington Post disinformation 
cam pai?TI to p:od uce an image on the very day that the U.S. was sending troops 
to Saudi Arabia t~at Iraq was ~ot going to leave Kuwait, would not negotiate, 
and was about to invade Saudi Arabia. 
~s dis.course dominated the news coverage for the day. On an August 7, 
PBS discussion of the proper U.S. response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, co-
anchor. Judy Woodruff stated: ''Iraq's leader Saddam Hussein was quoted ~oday hn the Post story- D.K.] as saying the invasion of Kuwait was irrevers-
ible and permanent.:' ~ater on the same show, former national security adviser 
(and Jr:an/ Contra ~al) Robert McFarlane quoted the story as evidence that !f ussem :was. not go~ng to. leave Kuwait and that therefore a U.S. military 
interv.ention in Saudi Arabia was necessary. And in a discussion with Arab-
Amencan .lead~rs as to whether a U.S. military intervention was justified, ~oodruff inte11ecte~ : the U.S. charge in Baghdad did have a two hour meeting 
with Saddam Hus~ei~ y~sterday which by all accounts was very unsatisfactory 
as Saddam Hussein msisted that the was going to stay in Kuwait and made ~hat w~re reported to be veiled threats against other nations in the area" - all h~s w~ich Bush administration officials fed to the Post which were then 
disseminated by other mainstream media.13 
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On the morning of August 8, presidential press secretary Marlin Fitzwater 
told reporters that in a tense, two-hour session between Hussein and the 
highest-ranking American official i~ Iraq~ charged' a(faires Jos~ph Wilson, the 
Iraqi president "indicated he had no intention ofleaving Kuwait and had every 
indication of staying and claiming it as his own." This false account of the 
conversation with Wilson was printed in the Boston Globe, Newsday, the.Jerusa-
lem Post the New York Times, the Daily Telegraph, the Toronto StarL The Tzmes (of 
London), and the Washington Times. Summaries of the first week of the crisis in 
the Los Angeles Times (Aug. 9,. 1990) and the Sunday. Times of Londo~ (Au?. 12, 
1990) presented the false Bush administration vers10n of the Hussein/Wilson 
meeting as the turning point in the crisis which seemin~ly indicate~ t~at Iraq 
was not going to pull out of Kuwait or negotiate a solution to the cnsis. 
The U.S. was thusabletoproducetheimpression that Iraq had no intention 
of leaving Kuwait and negotiating a solution to the c:nsis by disto~ting the 
discussion between Iraq and Joseph Wilson and the mamstr~m media. s~rved 
as a compliant conduit for the U.S. disinformation campaign. In his early 
morning television speech on August 8, which announced and defended 
sending U.S. troops to Saudi Arabia, Bush claimed that "the Saudi government 
requested our help, and I responded to that requ:st by ?r~em:g U.S. air. and 
ground forces to deploy to the kingdom of Saudi Arabia. This "':as a he as 
accounts of the Saudi-U.S. negotiations later indicated that the United States 
pressured the Saudis to allow the U.S. military intervention into their }4untry 
(Woodward 1991, pp. 24lff. and Salinger and Laurent 1991, pp. 1 lOff.). . Bush 
repeated the dubious claim that "Iraq has massed a.n enor~ous wa.r m~chin~ on 
the Saudi border," and his administration emphasized this theme 1n discussion 
with the media, which obediently reproduced the argument. At 9:24 a.1:1. on 
August 8, for instance, Bob Zelnick, ABC's Pentagon correspondent, dutifully 
reported that the Pentagon informed him that Iraqi troop presence had doubl~ 
since the invasion of Kuwait, that there were now more than 200,000 Iraqi 
troops in Kuwait with a large force poised to invade Saudi Arabia. 
Yet it is not at all certain how many troops Iraq actually deployed in Kuwait 
during the first six weeks of the crisis. All preinvasion reports produced by the 
Bush administration indicated that Iraq had amassed about 100,000 ~oops.on 
the border of Kuwait. Initial reports during the first few days after the invas10n 
suggested that Iraq actually had between 80,000 and l?<J:OOO t_roo~s in Kuw~it, 
more than enough for an occupation, as the Bush administration liked to point 
out and as the mainstream media diligently reported; once the U.S. forces were 
on their way to Saudi Arabia, the Iraqi forces suddenly doubled. But thes.e 
figures invariably came from Bush administration. or P~ntagon sources, and ~t 
was later claimed that Iraqi troops were actually being withdrawn from Kuwait 
at the very moment when the Bush administration and Pe~t~gon asserted that 
they were doubling their forces. After the war, Pentagon officials told .U.S. New_s 
and World Report writers that the divisions positi~ned furthest south m Kuwait 
were not the elite Republican Guard forces, which were moved bad~ to Iraq 
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during the first week of the invasion (1992, pp. 97-98). A senior Central 
Command officer conceded after the war ended that: "We still have no hard 
evidence that he ever intended to invade Saudi Arabia. We believe that he did. 
But n?ne of the. ca~tu~ed documents or prisoner debriefs has come up with 
anything hard [indicating an attack on the Saudi oil fields]" (U.S. News and 
World Report 1992, p. 98). 
After the war, it was evident that the U.S. had vastly overestimated the 
n~ber of Iraqi troops in Kuwait, and there is reason to believe that the U.S. 
estimates were h_ighly flawed ~om the beginning. St. Petersburg Times reporter 
Jean H~lle~ published two stones (Nov. 30 and Jan. 6) suggesting that satellite 
photos indicated far fewer Iraqi troops in Saudi Arabia than the Bush admin-
istration claimed (the Jan. 6 story was republished in In These Times, Feb. 27, 
1991, pp. 1-2). Heller's suspicions were roused when she saw a December 3 
1990 .Newsweek "Periscope" item that ABC News had never used several 
satellite photos of Saudi Arabia and southern Kuwait taken in early September. 
Purchased by ABC from the Soviet commercial satellite agency Soyez-Karta 
the photos ~ere exp:cted to ~eveal th.e presence of a massive Iraqi troop deployme~t in Kuwait, but failed to disclose anything near the number of 
troops clarmed by the Bush administration. ABC declined to use them and 
Heller got her newspaper to purchase the satellite photos of Kuwait from Au~st 8 and September 13 and of Saudi Arabia from September 11. Two s.atelbt~ experts who had formerly worked for the U.S. government failed to 
find evidence of the al~eged build~p. "'!he.Pentagon kept saying the bad guys 
were there, but ':e don t see anything to indicate an Iraqi force in Kuwait of even 
20 percen~ the size the administration claimed,' said Peter Zimmerman, who 
served with. t~e U.~. ~rms Control and Disarmament Agency during the 
Reagan adm1n1stration (Heller, In These Times, Feb. 27, p. 2). 
Both satellite photos taken on August 8 and September 13 showed a sand 
cover on the roads, suggesting that there were few Iraqi troops on the Saudi bo~der ~here the Bush administration claimed that they were massed, threat-
enu~g to inv~de Saudi Arabia. Pictures of the main Kuwaiti airport showed no 
Iraqi planes in sight, though large numbers of U.S. planes were visible in Saudi 
Arabia .. The Pentagon refused to comi:nent on the satellite photos, but to 
s1:1ggestions advance~ by ABC (which refused to show the photos) that the 
pictures were not high enough quality to detect the Iraqi troops Heller 
responded that the photograph of the north of Saudi Arabia showed all the 
roads swept clean of sand and clearly depicted the U.S. troop buildup in the 
area. By September, the Pentagon was claiming that there were 265 000 Iraqi troop~ and 2,200 tanks, which posed a threat to Saudi Arabia, de~loyed in 
Kuwait, but the photographs reveal nowhere near this number and, so far, the 
U.S. government has refused to release its satellite photographs. 
In~eed, Woo~ward (1991) noted that the Saudis had sent scouts across the 
border into Kuwait after the Iraqi invasion to see if they could detect the Iraqi 
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troops that the United States claimed were massed for a possible invasion of 
their country. "The scouts had come back reporting nothing. There was no trace 
of the Iraqi troops heading toward the kingdom" (Woodward 1991, pp. 258-
259). Soon after, the U.S. team arrived with photos of the Iraqi troops allegedly 
massed on the Saudi border and General Norman Schwarzkopf explained to 
the Saudis that the Iraqis had sent small command-and-control units ahead of 
the mass of troops, which would explain why the Saudi scouts failed t~ see th~m 
(Woodward 1991, p. 268).15 Former CIA officer Ralph McGehee told 1oumal~st 
Joel Bleifuss: "There has been no hesitation in the past to use doctored satellite 
photographs to support the policy position that the U.S. wants supported" (In 
These Times, Sept. 19, 1990, p. 5). Indeed, Emery (1991) reported that King 
Hussein of Jordan was sent similar pictures of tanks moving along roads near 
the Saudi/Kuwaiti border and that King Hussein claimed that the Saudis 
"pressed the panic button" when they saw the photographs (p. 15). King 
Hussein was skeptical and "argued that if Saddam Hussein had wanted to 
invade the Saudis, he would have moved immediately, when the only thing 
between him and the Saudi capital was a tiny and untested-if expensively 
equipped-Saudi army'' (Emery 1991). 
This account is supported by Dunnigan and Bay's diagram of Iraqi de-
fenses in August 1990 when U.S. forces arrived in Saudi Arabia. (19.91, p. 248). 
Iraqi troops are presented in a defensive posture around Kuwait City and not 
poised on the border ready to invade. Later diagrams by the authors (1991, pp. 
256-257) show Iraqi troops located in defensive positions on the border but 
there is no evidence that they were ever set to invade Saudi Arabia. Thus, there 
are reasons to believe that the Bush administration exaggerated the number of 
Iraqi troops in Kuwait and the threat to Saudi Arabia to scar~ the Sau~is into 
accepting the U.S. troops and to justify its own troop buildup in the region ~nd 
eventual military action. The mainstream media .reproduced the U.S. cl~s 
and figures as facts with newspapers like the Washington Post and the television 
networks serving as conduits for Bush administration disinformation cam-
paign. 
Moreover, the Washington Post followed the tradition of yellow journalism 
by urging Bush to military action on the basis of disinformation. The difference, 
however, between classical yellow journalism and the promotion by the Post of 
military action against Iraq was that William Randolph Hearst's pap~rs ~ad 
produced the lies themselves to help sell papers· and to push a policy line 
desired by the newspaper publisher, but during the Gulf crisis and war the 
mainstream media simply reproduced the lies and disinformation of the B1:1sh 
administration and Pentagon.16 Yet Post editorial writers and columrusts 
actively promoted a military solution, urging an attack on Baghdad even before 
Bush announced that he was sending troops to Saudi Arabia. 
Crucially, the major newspapers, news magazines, and t.elevisio~ net-
works did not criticize Bush's deployment or debate whether it was wise to 
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send so ma~y U.S. troops to Saudi Arabia in the first place. The alternative press 
argued against the deployment and for a UN peace-keeping force to be sent to 
the area: rat~er than~ massive U.S. military force, but this position got almost 
no heanng 1n the mainstream media. Furthermore, the leaders of the Demo-
cra~c party al~~ faile.d to ~ticize the U.S. military deployment, which points 
again to the cns1s of hberahsm. Yet there were many oppositional voices to the 
Bush administration's policies that were simply excluded from the mainstream 
~edi~, thus prech~ding serious debate over the proper U.S. response to Iraq's 
~v~s1on of Ku.wait. B~t the ma~s~ream media only draw on an extremely 
limited repertoire of v01ces and pnvilege the same administration officials and 
top. Democratic Party leaders, thus freezing significant views out of public 
policy debates and intensifying the crisis of democracy in the United States. 
Notes 
1. This text is extracted from my forthcoming book The Persian Gulf TV War 
(Kellner 1992). 
2. See The Economist which claimed that with Iraq's invasion of Kuwait it 
controlled twenty percent of the "world's known oil reserves" and would 
rival S~udi Arabia as OPEC's "swing" producer (Aug. 4, 1990, p. 13). Time 
magazine asserted thatlraq doubled the oil under its control to some twenty 
percent of the world's known reserve and that only Saudi Arabia, with 
twenty-five percent, had more (Aug. 13, 1990, p. 16). In fact, there were 
arguments that the claims concerning the amount of oil controlled by 
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq were greatly exaggerated and that the 
phrase "known oil reserves" was misleading because there are vast oil 
resources that have not been developed in the United States, Soviet Union, 
and off the Falkland islands. Vialls (1911) claimed that the undeveloped oil 
reserves off the Falkland Islands are much larger than the Saudi Arabia oil 
reserves, but the cost of developing the off-shore oil resources far from 
refineries and distribution, would require a much higher per-ba~l oil price 
than the market is current yielding. He suggested that the Gulf war might 
have ~een in part~ ~cal ploy to help exhaust Saudi, Kuwaiti, and Iraqi oil 
supp hes so that 011 p:ices could go up enough to make it pay to develop the 
Fa~kl~nd o~-shoreoll resources, thus producing a bonanza for the U.S. and 
Bnta1n which would control these oil resources. 
3. The Washington Post also reported on August 4, 1990, that "U.S. intelligence 
yesterda~ monitored a new buildup of 100,000 Iraqi troops in Kuwait south 
of th~cap1taland near the border with Saudi Arabia." On Augusts, the Post 
pubhsh~d a sto~ by Charl~s Ba?~ock on the possibility of an Iraqi invasion 
of Saudi Arabia and the 1nab1bty of the Saudis to defend themselves· 
ed~torial writer_Jim Hoagland contributed an article on "Stopping Saddam'~ 
Drive for .Dominan~e," a:guing against "appeasement" of Iraq. Thus, the 
Post consistently disseminated the disinformation of an imminent Iraqi 
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invasion of Saudi Arabia. 
4. A New York Times summary of the genesis of the war by Thomas Friedman 
and Patrick Tyler on March 3, 1991, claimed that the Bush administration 
had decided on the path to war in September; the Times' s analysis, however, 
suggested that Bush and Scowcroft were pushing the military option from 
the beginning ( p. A 12). Emery (1991, p . 19) wrote that King Hussein told him 
that Margaret Thatcher blurted out on August 3 that "troops were halfway 
to their destination" before the official request came for them to go to the 
Middle East. In addition, I met a soldier on an airplane in December 1990 
who told me that he had been sent to the Gulf some days before the official 
U.S. deployment had been announced. 
5. The New York Times also began attacking Iraq and Saddam Hussein, 
publishing stories and columns on August 5, 1990, wit~ headlines:" Arab ?f 
Vast Ambition-Saddam Hussein," "Iraq Makes Its Bid to Run the Show m 
the Middle East," "Stopping Saddam's Drive for Dominance," and "Stop 
Hussein with Force if Necessary." For a comparative analysis of New York 
Times and Washington Post coverage of the crisis in the Gulf, see Malek and 
Leidig 1991. 
6. On the "Saddam-as-Hitler" theme, see Chapter 2Kellner 1992. 
7. ''Yellow journalism" is a term associated with the sensation-mongering 
journalism that began in the late 19th century with Joseph Pulitzer's World 
and William Randolph Hearst's San Francisco Examiner and New_ York 
Journal. Hearst and other "yellow journalists" produced a war hystena and 
campaigned for a war against Spain in Cuba, often trumping up false threats 
against the United States. See the chapter on ''The Age of Yellow Journal-
ism" in Emery and Emery 1992, pp. 226ff. 
8. On August 6, 1954, the New York Times published an editorial celeb~a ting the 
overthrow of the Mossadegh government in Iran and the restoration of the 
shah, accompanied by a takeover of 40% of the Iranian oil by U.S. corpora-
tions, breaking a British monopoly. The editors wrote: "Underdeveloped 
countries with rich resources now have an object lesson in the heavy cost 
that must be paid by one of their number which goes be~erk wit~ fanatic~} 
nationalism. It is perhaps too much to hope that Iran s expe~ence will 
prevent the rise of Mossadeghs in other countries, but that expenence ~ay 
at least strengthen the hands of more reasonable and more ~ar-see1ng 
leaders." Namely, those who will have a clear-eyed under~tand1ng of the 
U.S.'s overriding priorities (thanks to Noam Chomsky for this ref~rence) . In 
this context, the U.S. military intervention and Gulf war was an obJect lesson 
to Third World leaders who do not follow U.S. priorities pnd policies. 
9. Some West German government reports indicated that it was really Syrian 
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connections and not Libyan ones who were responsible for the bombing. On 
Oct. 29, 1986, John Laurence on ABC News quoted top German officials as 
attributing ~he disco bombing to Syria. See also the article by Elaine Scio lino, 
New York Tunes, Nov. 20, 1986, who reported that a number of administra-
tion officials said privately that the disco bombing was carried out by the 
same organization responsible for the bombing of an Arab social club in 
West Berlin, and that pretrial testimony linked Syria, not Libya, to that 
attack. A few days later, Der Spiegel reported suspicions that the perpetra-
tors were actually double agents working for the Israeli secret services (Dec. 
1, 1986), a story reproduced in the Boston Globe, Dec. 1, 1986; see the 
dis~ssion in Chomsky 1987, pp. 113ff. A report, broadcast Sept. 14, 1990, on 
Radio Deutsche Welle, suggested that the CIA knew that a terrorist bomb-
ing of the disco was in the works, but failed to maintain proper security, 
perhaps to give the Reagan administration a pretext for bombing Libya; see 
the discussion in Joel Bleifuss, "The First Stone," In These Times, Sept. 26, 
1990, p. 5. 
10.1:11s same Patrick Tyle~ in the same Washington Post had published a puff 
piece on Saddam Hussem on Mayl3, 1989 (p. A13) describing how Hussein 
was pursuing the "politics of pragmatism," moderating Iraq's previous 
radical tradition "in favor of friendly overtures to Arab moderates and the 
West." Christopher Hitchens noted that the New York Times also character-
ized Iraq as "pragmatic" and "cooperative," attributing these virtues to 
Hussein's "personal strength" (Harper's, Jan. 1991, p. 72). Yet the same 
Hus~ein had s~ddenly become the Post's ''beast of Baghdad" and the 
prev10usly.b~sti~l ~afez al-Assad of Syria had become "pragmatic." Obvi-
ous!~, ~esti~hty 1s 1n the eyes of the beholder and the policies of the current 
adm1rustration, which opportunistic journalists are only too eager to serve. 
11. Karsh and ~autsi (1991) has been received in the scholarly community as 
the .mo~t reli~ble book on Saddam Hussein and Iraq yet to appear; see the 
review m Middle East International, August 30, 1991, p. 22. 
12. James Atkins, Nixon's former ambassador to Saudi Arabia and a career 
diplon:iat, t?ld In These ~imes: ."The U.S. deployment is totally unnecessary. 
!her~ is g01ng to ~e no ~vas1on. Saddam Hussein is a rational person; an 
invas10n of Saudi Arabia would have been an irrational act." Atkins 
exp.lained tha~ since the Carter Doctrine was a major tenet of U.S. foreign 
policy, Hussem would know that any attack on Saudi Arabia would have 
brought a swift U.S. mil~taryresponse(Aug. 29, 1991, p . 5). In addition, after 
the war, Los Angeles Tzmes reporter Jack Nelson stated in a symposium 
sponsored ?Y the Gannett Foundation: "The reports of Iraqi troops massed 
at the Saudi border w_ere c~rtainly intended to tell the American people that 
there was a thre:at of mvas1on, when in fact there weren't that many [Iraqi] 
troopsatall.Ithinktodaymostgovernmentpeoplewilltellyouthatnobody 
really thought that Saddam Hussein was going to go into Saudi Arabia; but 
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the story helped marshall public opinion behind the war effort" (in LaMay 
et al. 1991, pp. 73-74). In fact, the mainstream media were saying that there 
was a threat that Iraq was going to invade Saudi Arabia and that the U.S. 
military deployment was thus necessary; see the clips from editorials from 
the major U.S. newspaper in LaMay, et al., 1991, pp. 54-55. 13. Reuters 
transmitted the Washington Post version of the Hussein/Wilson meeting 
and it was published in newspapers such as the Toronto Star, USA Today, and 
Newsday. ABC and the other TV networks also bought into the Washington 
Post version of the meeting between Saddam Hussein and Joe Wilson. In 
explaining why the Bush administration was sending troops to Saudi 
Arabia, ABC White House correspondent Brit Hume noted on the August 
7 edition of ABC World News Tonight: "of course, there was a meeting 
yesterday in Baghdad in which the United States charged' affaires was told in 
no uncertain terms by Saddam Hussein that not only did he not intend to 
leave Kuwait, he intended to claim it as his own. Finally, intelligence reports 
overnight indicated what the White House is calling an 'imminent threat to 
Saudi Arabia' from the very positioning of the Iraqi forces in Kuwait." That 
evening on ABC's Nightline, host Ted Koppel informed the .audience that 
he'd just received information "from my colleague Bob Zelruck over at the 
Pentagon, who quotes sources over there as saying that there .is stron~ 
evidence that the Iraqis are now massing along the border with Saudi 
Arabia and that there is some fear that they may launch an invasion even 
before U.S. troops get there." This disinformation was obviously~~ legiti-
mate the U.S. deployment and to create anxiety that could be utilized to 
mobilize consent to the Bush administration policy. 
13. The Washington Post cheerleader for the war, Jim Hoagland, dutifully 
attacked "Saddam's Big Lie" (that dispossessed Arabs would supposedly 
profit from his seizureofKuwait's oil) in theAugust9 edition, failing to note 
that it was Bush who was producing a really Big Lie concerning Iraq's 
alleged threat to Saudi Arabia-a lie reproduced by Hoagland. Hoaglan~ 
also attacked CBS for interviewing Jordanians who were sympathetic 
towards Saddam Hussein and who opposed the U .S. military intervention 
and war, as if it was the duty of journalists simply to parrot the line of the 
administration rather than providing a range of viewpoints on controver-
sial and important issues. 
14. Interestingly, there was a report that the Soviets lau~che~ a new phot? 
reconnaissance spy satellite within 48 hours of the 1n.vas10n of Kuwait 
whose orbit was identical to the U.S. satellite(PeaceNet,mideast.gulf,Aug.15, 
1990). But there have been no release of pictures or information from t~e 
Soviet government, so we have only the visual evidence of the Soviet 
commercial satellite pictures against the claims of the U.S. government. 
15. For the record, I might note that the New York Times slavis~~ followed the 
Bush administration line through the early days of the cns1s rather than 
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actively promoting the military solution a la the Washington Post. When, on 
the day of the invasion of Kuwait, Bush attacked Iraq's "naked aggression" 
of Kuwait but did not call for a military intervention, the Times R. W. A pp le, 
titled his front-page story "Naked Aggression" and the Times's editorialist 
opined: "The U.S. has no treaty obligation to come to Kuwait's aid. But the 
gulf states and most nations still look to Washington for leadership and help 
in organizing action. President Bush has responded with the right lead-a 
strong national stand and a strong push for collective diplomacy'' (Aug. 3, 
1990). When, shortly thereafter, Bush sent U.S. troops to Saudi Arabia, the 
Times quickly got on board, writing in an August 9 editorial appropriately 
titled "The U.S. Stands Up. Who Else?": "President Bush has drawn a line 
in the sand, committing U.S. forces to face down Saddam Hussein .... On 
balance, he has made the right choice in the right way." 
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Are You Telling Me that I'm Politically Correct?: 
An Investigation of Representations of the 'Politically Correct' 
By Gary Weissman 
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee 
Recent articles on political correctness (PC), such as those appearing inNew 
York, Newsweek and Time magazines, portray PC as a threat to truth, freedom, 
academic rigour, and American values. Instead of seeing PC as a potentially 
constructive moment in the development of non-coercive knowledges of self 
and others, many popular representations have construed an inverse logic. 
Subsequently these representations of PC become indirect affirmations of 
entrenched prejudices, especially about class, race, and gender. 
Are you politically correct? Instead of providing my own definition of PC, 
in order to answer this question, I will examine the manipulation of this term 
in recent popular media representations. 
Are we politically correct? And more importantly, are we white? 
"Are you politically correct? 
"Am I Misogynistic, Patriarchal, Gynophobic, Phallocentric, 
Logocentric? Am I Guilty of Racism, Sexism, Classism? Do I Say 
'Indian' Instead of 'Native American'? 'Pet' Instead of 'Animal 
Companion'?" 
Rather than answering these questions posed on the cover of the 21 J anua1?' 
1991 issue of New York magazine, one needs to investigate the strategy of this 
line of questioning. The address to the magazine's potenti.al consumer ~~rent 
in the first question- are you politically co:rect- gives way. to, ~direct 
inquiry-am I misogynistic ... am I guilty of raasm ... do I say 'Indian instead 
of 'Native American'. Why does the question "are you politically corre,c~" 
transform itself into "am I politically correct"? On the one ~and the 'I. is 
synonymous with the 'you', the consumer who, when res~o~dmg to th~ first 
question, asks "Well am I politically correct?" and then trails into the senes of 
questions provided, as if the tally of answers will provide an overall 'ye~' or 'no' 
as to whether one is politically correct. But on the other hand the 'I can be 
identified as the collegiate white male whose head fills the front cover of New 
York magazine. The questions which begin "Am I. .. " a~ superimposed ?ver 
this youth's face; it is as if he is asking himself these questions. These questions 
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